Cleveland State University

EngagedScholarship@CSU
Law Faculty Articles and Essays

Faculty Scholarship

Summer 2003

Supreme Court Watch
Reginald Oh
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland State University, r.oh@csuohio.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles
Part of the Law Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Repository Citation
Oh, Reginald, "Supreme Court Watch" (2003). Law Faculty Articles and Essays. 1025.
https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/fac_articles/1025

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Law Faculty Articles and Essays by an authorized administrator of
EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact research.services@law.csuohio.edu.

SUPREME

COURT WATCH
By Reginald C. Oh

I

n its 2002-03 Term, the United States Supreme Court
handed down a key decision dealing with the issue ofrace
at the state and local government levels. In Virginia v.
Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536 (2003), the Supreme Court considered
whether the State of Virginia's statute banning cross burn
ing with "an intent to intimidate a person or group of per
sons" violates the First Amendment. Id at 1541. The Court,
in an opinion written by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor,
struck down the cross-burning statute as an unconstitutional
restriction offree speech. Specifically, the Court held that the
"prima facie evidence" provision ofthe cross burning statute,
which treats any act of cross burning as prima facie evidence
ofthe intent to intimidate others, is facially unconstitution
al. Id Even though the Court found Virginia's statute con
stitutionally infirm, however, it held that state and local gov
ernments may permissibly draft carefully tailored cross
burning statutes, so long as the statutes target for prohibi
tion a specific type ofcross burning-cross burning carrying
the threat of imminent violence. Id
This case involved a consolidated appeal involving three
defendants convicted separately ofviolating section 18.2-423
ofthe Virginia Criminal Code, which states, in part: "It shall
be unlawful for any person or persons, with the intent of in
timidating any person or groups ofpersons, to burn, cause to
be burned, a cross on the property of another, highway or
other public place." VA. CODE ANN.§ 18.2-423 (1996). On
August 22, 1998, defendant Barry Black led a Ku Klux Klan
rally on private property, with consent ofthe property owner.
At the conclusion of the rally, a 25 to 30 foot cross was lit on
fire, and as the cross burned, the Klan members played
''Amazing Grace" over loudspeakers. A sheriff observing the
rally arrested Black, who acknowledged that he was responsi
ble for burning the cross. Black was convicted at trial and
sentenced to a $2,500 fine. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1542.
On May 2, 1998, respondents Elliot and O'Mara burned
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a cross on the property ofJames Jubilee, their African Amer
ican next-door neighbor.Jubilee had earlier complained to
Elliot's mother about shots being fired behind Elliot's home,
and in apparent retaliation, Elliot and O'Mara set the cross
on fire on Jubilee's property. Elliot and O'Mara were charged
with attempted cross burning and conspiracy to commit cross
burning. O'Mara pleaded guilty to both counts, but in doing
so, reserved the right to challenge the constitutionality of the
statute. Elliot chose to defend himself at a jury trial. At El
liot's trial, the judge instructed the jury that the Common
wealth must prove that "the defendant intended to commit
cross burning" and that "the defendant had the intent ofin
timidating any person or group ofpersons." Id at 1543. The
jury found Elliot guilty of attempted cross burning, but ac
quitted him of conspiracy to commit cross burning. Id
Each respondent appealed to the Supreme Court ofVir
ginia, arguing that section 18.2-423 is facially unconstitu
tional. The Supreme Court ofVirginia consolidated all three
cases and held that the statute impermissibly infringes upon
constitutionally protected speech. It reasoned that the statute
is "facially unconstitutional because it prohibits otherwise
permitted speech solely on the basis ofcontent, and [because]
the statute is overbroad." Black v. Commonwealth oJVirginia,
553 S.E.2d 738, 740 (2001). The Commonwealth of Vir
ginia appealed the Virginia Supreme Court's ruling to the
U.S. Supreme Court.
Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality, 1 held that "Vir
ginia's statute does not run afoul ofthe First Amendment inso
far as it bans cross burning with intent to intimidate." Black, 123
S. Ct. at 1549. The Court struck down the statute, however,
holding that the prirna facie evidence provision ofthe statute,
as interpreted by the Virginia ModelJury Imtructiom, rendered
the statute facially unconstitutional. The Court then upheld the
reversal ofrespondent Black's conviction, but with respect to
respondents Elliot and O'Mara, the Court vacated the judg
ment ofthe Virginia Supreme Court and remanded the case for
the Virginia Supreme Court to determine whether the "prirna
facie evidence provision" is severable, and if so, whether respon
dents Elliot and O'Mara could be retried. Id at 1552.
In striking down the Virginia statute, the Court focused
its analysis on the provision of the statute stating that "[a]ny
such burning ofa cross shall be prirna facie evidence ofan in
tent to intimidate a person or group of persons." VA. CODE
ANN.§ 18.2-423 (1996). The statutory provision creates an
"inference" that the cross burning was indeed done with the
intent to intimidate. Once that inference is raised, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to disprove and rebut that initial
inference with evidence suggesting that his or her motive was
not to intimidate another person or persons.
The Court held that this "prima facie evidence" provision
violated the First Amendment, because it would create the
possibility that the state could convict a person who burned
a cross solely as a means of political expression, and not as a
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means to intimidate another person. Black, 123 S. Ct. at
1551. It is "overbroad," because it fails to distinguish between
different types ofcross-burning, and treats them all as "prima
facie evidence" that the act was done with the intent to in
timidate. Thus, the Court reasoned that the "prima facie evi
dence" provision, read literally, would treat a cross burning
done as part of a movie or play as the same as a cross burned
on the property of another person without that person's con
sent. Both acts of cross burning would give rise to the infer
ence that the cross burning was committed with the intent to
intimidate, thus creating a possibility that a person may be
prosecuted and convicted for engaging in lawful political
speech, like burning a cross for filmmaking purposes. For the
Court, therefore, this prima facie evidence provision would
"create an unacceptable risk ofthe suppression ofideas." Id.
Although the Court struck down Virginia's cross burning
statute, it took pains to emphasize that carefully tailored cross
burning statutes may survive First Amendment scrutiny. To
be sure, states and localities may not prohibit cross burning
conducted as an attempt to symbolize "shared group identity
and ideology," because, according to the Court, ritualistic
cross burning is a form ofcore symbolic political speech that is
protected by the First Amendment. In reaching this conclu
sion, the Court emphasized that"[t]hroughout the history of
the Klan, cross burnings have also remained potent symbols of
shared group identity and ideology." Id. at 1546. The burning
cross is a central ritual of Klan gatherings, and it is also inti
mately connected with the religious beliefs of Klan members.
The Court noted that"[t ]ypically, a cross burning would start
with a prayer by the 'Klavern' minister, followed by the singing
ofOnward Christian Soldiers." Id.
The Court, however, distinguished cross burning as a
symbolization of shared group identity and ideology from
cross burning as a historically based form of intimidation.
The Court noted that ''when a cross burning is directed at a
particular person not affiliated with the Klan, the burning
cross often serves as a message of intimidation, designed to
inspire in the victim a fear ofbodily harm." Id. To buttress its
conclusion that there is a strong, historically based associa
tion between cross burning and violence, the Court devoted
several pages to discuss the historical association between the
Ku Klux Klan and the use of a burning cross as "a tool of in
timidation and a threat of impending violence." Id. at 1545.
For example, the Court noted that in Miami in 1941, the
Klan used cross burning to help reinforce racially segregated
housing patterns. "The Klan burned four crosses in front of
a proposed housing project, declaring, 'We are here to keep
niggers out of town.... When the law fails you, call on us."'
Id. (quoting S. KENNEDY, SOUTHERN EXPOSURE 176 (1991)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, in 1949 in
Richmond, Virginia, the Klan burned a cross on the front
yard of an African American school teacher who had just
moved into a block formerly occupied only by whites. After
the cross burning, the school teacher felt compelled to ask the
police for protection. Id.
The Court also emphasized that, historically, the Klan
used cross burning to terrorize people not just on the basis of

12

race or religion, but as "embodied threats to [all] people
whom the Klan deemed antithetical to its goals." Id. It noted
that, "in Alabama in 1942, in 'a whirlwind climax to weeks
of flogging and terror,' the Klan burned crosses in front ofa
union hall on the eve of a labor election," id. (quoting
KENNEDY, supra, at 180), and that a rash ofcross burning in
cidents in the late 1940s compelled the then governor ofVir
ginia to state "that he would 'not allow any of our people of
any race to be subjected to terrorism or intimidation in any
form by the Klan or any other organization."'2
Thus, given the strong historical link between the cross
burning and violence, the Court held that cross burning with
the intent to intimidate may be prohibited, even though such
a prohibition would constitute "content based discrimina
tion." The Court acknowledged such a prohibition is con
tent-based discrimination, because even cross burning with
the intent to intimidate still is conveying a message; it is still a
means of communication. That message, however, is limited
to the message ofintimidation. Such speech, the Court held,
falls outside of the protection of the First Amendment and
may be prohibited.
Moreover, the Court reasoned that a state may constitu
tionally prohibit a specific subset of acts of intimidation.
Thus, a statute prohibiting a specific form of intimidation,
cross burning, is constitutionally permissible, because "the
basis for the content discrimination consists entirely of the
very reason the entire class of speech at issue is proscribable,
no significant danger ofidea or viewpoint discrimination ex
ists." Id. at 1549. In other words, because, as a general mat
ter, statements or acts seeking to intimidate others fall outside
of the protection of the First Amendment, a state may con
stitutionally prohibit specific statements seeking to intimi
date, so long as it does so for the same reason that the gener
al act of intimidation may be prohibited. The Court
analogized a prohibition on cross burning conducted with
the intent to intimidate to federal statutes that specifically
prohibit threats ofviolence directed against the United States
president. Similarly, the Court analogized a prohibition on
cross burning with the intent to intimidate to statutes that
prohibit specific categories of obscenity that it deems to be
most patently offensive because of their prurience. Thus, if a
state chooses to specifically ban cross burning as a most vir
ulent and destructive method of intimidation, such a statute
is constitutional, because the reason for specifically prohibit
ing a certain method of intimidation is for the same reason
that all acts and messages ofintimidation are proscribable.
The Court, in upholding Virginia's statute, distinguished it
from the ordinance it struck down in R.A. V v. St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377 (1991), which unconstitutionally prohibited cross
burning conducted with "knowledge or reasonable grounds to
know that the cross burning would arouse anger, alarm or re
sentment in others on the basis ofrace, color, creed, religion or
gender."ST.PAUL,MlNN.,LEGIS. CODE§ 292.02 (1990).The
St. Paul ordinance was unconstitutional for two reasons. First,
the ordinance engaged in impermissible viewpoint discrimina
tion, because it prohibited cross burning directed only "toward
one ofthe specified disfavored topics" ofrace, color, creed, reState & Local Law News, Volume 26, Number 4, Summer 2003

ligion or gender, Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting R.A. V., 505
U.S. at 391), but permitted cross burning conducted on the
basis ofother topics, such as hatred toward lawyers or unions.
The Court in Black reasoned, however, that Virginia's statute
does not engage in such similar viewpoint discrimination, be
cause the statute prohibits all cross burnings done with the in
tent to intimidate, rather than prohibiting only cross burnings
done with the intent to intimidate for a particular reason or tar
geted against a specific racial or religious group.
Second, Justice O'Connor emphasized another significant
difference between the constitutionally valid Virginia statute
and the constitutionally infirm St. Paul ordinance. The St.
Paul ordinance prohibited cross burning that causes "anger
and resentment" in a person. For the Court, government may
regulate speech intended to invoke feelings of terror and in
timidation, but it may not regulate speech intended to invoke
merely feelings of anger and resentment. The Court empha
sized this distinction between cross burning made in an at
tempt to arouse anger and hatred versus cross-burning made
in an attempt to intimidate, primarily to protect cross-burning
as a form ofpolitical expression. Cross-burning at a Ku Klux
Klan rally, for example, may, "even at a political rally, arouse a
sense of anger or hatred among the vast majority of citizens
who see a burning cross. But this sense of anger or hatred is
not sufficient to ban all cross burnings." Id Dissenting or con
troversial political speech often is expressed to arouse anger
and resentment in its target audience, as is arguably the case
with flag burning as a means of political expression. Such
speech, however, is core political speech that deserves the
strongest First Amendment protection.
The import ofthe Court's decision in Black is that narrow
ly tailored statutes banning cross-burning will survive First
Amendment scrutiny, so long as the statute prohibits cross
burning as a category of"true threats" and if it does not pro
hibit cross-burning intended to intimidate based on a specif
ic content (e.g., intent to intimidate on the basis ofrace).
Moreover, although the Court struck down Virginia's
"prirna facie evidence provision'' as interpreted by the Virginia
Model]ury Instructions, the Court did leave room open for the
possibility that a more carefully drafted "prima facie evidence
provision'' may survive a First Amendment challenge. For ex
ample, a prima facie evidence provision may pass constitu
tional muster if an inference of intent to intimidate is raised
only when a cross is burned on the property of another with
out that person's consent, or when a cross is burned according
to historically based methods associated with intimidation
and violence. Such a provision would more clearly separate
out those cross burnings committed with the intent to intim
idate from those cross burnings conducted as expressions of
"group identity and ideology."
In upholding the authority ofstates to regulate cross burn
ing carrying the threat ofviolence and intimidation, however,
the Court failed to clearly articulate a principle to explain why
it matters, for First Amendment purposes, whether a statute
proscribes cross burning conducted as an expression ofracist
ideology or whether a statute proscribes cross burning con
ducted with the intent to intimidate. That is because the
State & Local Law News, Volume 26, Number 4, Summer 2003

Court permits the government to engage in viewpoint and
content discrimination to regulate racist speech in other con
texts. Most notably, as noted by First Amendment scholars,
the government has regulated racist speech in the workplace
context. Under Title VII, the federal statute prohibiting racial
discrimination in the workplace, for example, pervasive hostile
speech made on the basis of race in the workplace may give
rise to a Title VII "hostile work environment" claim. 3 Thus, if
an employer permitted its employees to burn a cross at the
workplace, it is likely that racial minority employees would
have a very strong "hostile work environment" claim against
his or her employer for permitting such conduct. In this situ
ation, it would seem difficult to analytically distinguish a cross
burned at the workplace as a means of expressing a beliefin
white supremacy and a cross burned at the workplace as a
means ofintimidating another person. But, if the holding of
Black is extended to Title VII hostile work environment
claims, a court would be compelled to conclude that one form
of cross burning at the workplace is constitutionally protect
ed speech, while the other form of cross burning is not. That
result would be difficult to defend, because from the perspec
tive of employees subjected to the cross burning, both types
of cross burning would seem to create the conditions for a
hostile work environment claim. 4
Of course, the Court may distinguish cross burning at the
workplace from cross burning at a Ku Klux Klan rally. The
Court may contend that cross burning at the workplace is
prohibitable under Title VII, because such cross burning is
being targeted at a ·'captive audience." Or, the Court may
contend that such cross burning is permissible as a regula
tion of time, place, and manner. Whether those are nlid
bases to distinguish cross burning at the workplace from cross
burning at a political rally, the crucial point is that the basis
for making such a distinction does not fall on whether the
cross burning is a form ofpolitical expression or whether it is
a tool ofintimidation. Given that Title VII arguably engages
in content and viewpoint discrimination when it gives racial
groups a cause of action based on the racist, political speech
of their employers or fellow employees, the Court does not
provide a meaningful answer when it states that government
cannot prohibit cross burning at a political rally because such
a prohibition discriminates on the basis of content. That an
swer, the answer provided in Black, merely begs the follow
ing question: why does the Court permit the government to
engage in viewpoint discrimination and prohibit derogatory,
racist remarks in the workplace, but not similarly permit
viewpoint regulation of derogatory, racist, speech in other
contexts, as at a Ku Klux Klan rally?
In any event, to assist state and local government officials
in understanding the scope of their authority when it comes
to regulating certain acts that may potentially be protected by
the First Amendment, such as cross burning, the Court
should articulate clearer principles to explain under what
circumstances the government may appropriately engage in
content and viewpoint discrimination. Such clear and artic
ulate principles would provide much needed guidance to
continued on page 15
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Use L.Rep. 47 (3/12/2003)). The reasonable duck rule, under
which the Corps regulated isolated wetlands if a duck flying
across interstate boundaries might use them, may yet fly again
if Congress does overrule SWANCC and either the wildlife
sensitive rationale of GDF or the economic activity rationale
of Rancho Viejo are sustained by the Supreme Court.
Takings-Removal-Ripeness. This conundrum is a
favorite of mine. In Williamson County Regional Planning
Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), the
Supreme Court required a landowner to exhaust state tradi
tional court compensation remedies before going to federal
court. However, in City ofChicago v. International College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1997), the very same Supreme Court
said that a municipal defendant in a takings claim which had
been brought in state court pursuant to Williamson could re
move that case to federal court.
An enterprising landowner claimed that the decision in
City of Chicago in effect modified or partly overruled
Williamson. He argued that the Supreme Court could not
have intended to require a plaintiff to sue in a state forum, but
to give the defendants the option ofeither continuing in state
court or removing to federal court. He objected to entitling
the defendant, although not the plaintiff, to determine that
the case should be heard in federal court.
This seemingly clever argument was rejected by the Cir
cuit on February 13, 2003. Kottschade v. City ofRochester, 319
F3d 1038 (8th Cir.2003). While the situation may be anom
alous, the Eighth Circuit said, there is no indication that the
Supreme Court intended to overrule Williamson when it al
lowed removal of takings claims by defendants to federal
courts in the City ofChicago case.
In addition, the court declined the plaintiff's request to
determine that he could come back to federal court, and relit
igate all his factual claims, after ripening his case in state
court. The court felt it premature to determine what resjudi
cata or collateral estoppel effects might flow from a state
court adjudication.
Moratoria-Settlements-Damages. In Tahoe-Sierra
RegionalPreservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court held,
in a ruling lauded by local government, that moratoria were
not automatically takings which required payment of dam
ages. This ruling did not ward offa suit brought by North Key
Largo, Florida landowners against Monroe County for a tem
porary taking based on an eight year hold on development.
On July 17, 2001, the trial court, having found a 98 percent
diminution in value under the moratorium-from $5,887, 700
to $145 ,000-held that a taking had occurred. A jury trial was
then scheduled to determine damages. On May 4, on the eve
ofthe trial, the case settled for $5. 9 million, believed to be the
largest temporary takings recovery in U.S. history, according
to Land Use Law Report. This amount, coincidentally, equals
the $5.9 million the county paid for the land when it pur
chased it in 1990. Shadek v. Monroe County Board of County
Commissioners, (C.A.P. 95-398, settlement announced March
4, 2003), reported in 31 Land Use L.Rep. 43 (3/12/2003).
This is an extreme case. However, it demonstrates that ju
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bilant predictions by either landowners or governments con
cerning Supreme Court land use decisions tend to give way
to more nuanced results when cases are actually fought out
in the trenches. Clearly the trial judge in this case did not find
in the Tahoe-Sierra decision grounds for vacating his prior
ruling that the moratorium had constituted a taking even if
moratoria are not a per se taking.
Elementary Schools-Free Speech-Cruelty to Ani
mals. And finally, on April 15 the Third Circuit held that a
school could prevent a nine year old third grader from circulat
ing a petition opposing a class field trip to the circus. The peti
tion had stated, "we third grade kids don't want to go to the cir
cus because they hurt animals." The youngster had obtained
more than thirty signatures. When she continued her efforts at
a class recess, the teacher told her to put the petition away.
Although she was never punished, the student sued. An
issue in the case was whether Tinker v. Des Moines Indepen
dent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), even applied in ele
mentary schools. The majority held that Tinker, which said
the First Amendment did apply in high schools, had more
limited applicability to elementary schools, stating that "if
third graders enjoy rights under Tinker, those rights would
necessarily be very limited." Because the student had not
even been disciplined, and there was no punishment for her
expression, the court found no First Amendment violation.
One concurring judge, however, reached the same result on
a different basis-he was willing to assume there was a right
to petition, but that the school had not materially interfered
with it because it had on several occasions allowed her to ob
tain signatures. Walker-Serrano v. Leonard, 71U.S.L.W.1659
(3d Cir. 4/15/03).
And so it goes.

Supreme Court Watch
(continued from page 13)
state or local governments seeking to regulate certain acts,
like cross burning, in order to fulfill theirThirteenth Amend
ment duty to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, 5
and their Fourteenth Amendment duty to ensure all of their
residents the equal protection of the laws.
Endnotes
1. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices Breyer and Stevens joined Justice O'Con
nor's plurality opinion. Justices Scalia and Stevens wrote separate concurrences. Justice
Souter, joined byJustices Ginsburg and Kennedy, filed an opinion concurring in the
judgment and dissenting in part.Justice Souter concluded that the statute makes an un
constitutional content-based distinction, and that no exception should save the statute
from invalidation. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, because he would have
upheld the statute, including the prima facie evidence provision.
2. Black, 123 S. Ct. at 1545 (quoting D. CHALMERS, HOODED AMERICANISM: THE
HISTORY OF THE Ku KLUX KLAN 333 (1980)). The rash ofcross burning incidents in
the late 1940s catalyzed the Commonwealth ofVirginia to pass its first version ofits
cross burning statute in 1950. Id
3. See, e.g., Kingsley Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-Work Environment Ha
rassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 481 (1991).
4. See United States v. City ofBuffitlo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 633 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (hos
tile work environment claim brought on basis of posters posted at police station stating
"The KKK is still alive.").
5. See Akhil Amar, The Case ofthe Missing Amendments: RA. V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 106
HARv. L. REv. 124 (1992) (arguing thatThirteenth Amendment rrilght allow regulation of
cross burning as an attempt to eliminate cross burning as a badge and incident ofslavery).
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